This article begins in Part Two with the general history of privileges and continues with the United States Supreme Court's creation of the psychotherapist-patient privilege in federal court with the Court's decision in Jaffee v. Redmond. 14 Part Three discusses the history of the psychotherapist's duty-to-warn a third party from information obtained during the confidential and privileged conversations with the patient. It begins with both holdings in Tarasoffv. Regents ofUniv. of Cal. 15 and continues with the current status of the duty-to-warn in the Sixth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit followed by examples of a few of the state courts including Texas, Pennsylvania and Delaware. Part Four explores the implications of both Ewing decisions from the California Court of Appeals. The court held that a psychotherapist has a duty-to-warn a third party when the information was obtained from someone other than the patient. The duty-to-warn includes a situation where no psychotherapist-patient relationship exists between the information-provider and the psychotherapist.
II. HISTORY OF THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE

A. Privileges in General
Evidentiary privileges exist in an effort to balance the social costs of obtaining all necessary information for full realization of justice with the benefits of protecting sacred and privileged relationships. 16 A privilege is granted in order to encourage communication between the parties protected by a particular privilege. The parties must strike a balance between maintaining the zones of privacy in a relationship and the right to defend oneself or prosecute claims in court by obtaining necessary evidence. 17 Courts have found that the social cost of protecting these relationships far outweighs the testimonial benefits. 18 Communication privileges are generally held to the following conditions: also triggered under the statute if the threat of hann is communicated to the psychotherapist by a member of the patient's immediate family for the purpose of facilitating and furthering the patient's treatment.
Jd. (emphasis added)).
14. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996 [Vol. 3:171 (1) the privileged communications originate in confidence; (2) confidentiality is an essential element of the proper relationship between the parties; (3) the relationship is one that the community wishes to encourage; and (4) the injury caused by damaging the relationship through disclosure of the communications would be greater than the benefit gained. 19 Early English common law established that a privilege existed between an attorney and client, but it was not until 1828, ·in New York, that an attorney-client privilege was recognized in the Unite(! States. 20 A Senate Advisory Committee drafted thirteen proposed rules governing privileges. 21 Controversy arose in Congress regarding the scope and propriety of any privileges being promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act. 22 Congress was mainly concerned "about the omission ofboth the physician-patient privilege and the marital communications privilege" 23 and about "the fact that the rules as promulgated would have applied to all actions in federal courts, overriding state privilege law, even where state law supplied the rule of decision. 21. While there were thirteen proposed rules governing privileges, the federal courts were required to recognize nine, which included: "required reports, lawyer-client, psychotherapistpatient, husband-wife, communications to clergy, political vote, trade secrets The proposed rules that were submitted to Congress in 1972 included the psychotherapist-patient privilege in proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 504. 27 "[I]nherent in a Supreme Court recommendation of the psychotherapist-patient privilege is the Court's belief that confidentiality in psychotherapy would benefit both the patient and the public despite the evidentiary loss to society." 28 Although the proposed rules were rejected, 29 the Senate Judiciary Committee stated that even though it was only approving a general rule, it was not disapproving the recognition of any other privilege including: psychiatrist-patient, or husband-wife, or any other of the enumerated privileges contained in the Supreme Court rules. Rather, our action should be understood as reflecting the view that the recognition of a privilege based on a confidenreason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person. Long before · these proposed Rules of Evidence, the earliest psychotherapist-patient privilege case on record was decided on June 24, 1952, by the Circuit Court ofCookCounty, IDinois in the case of Binder v. Ruvell. 31 The Binder court stated that because a psychiatrist is a physician, the relationship between a psychiatrist and a patient is the same as that of a physician and a patient, which was already a recognized privileged relationship. The Binder court reasoned that a psychiatrist works with his patient to find the cause of mental and emotional problems in. the patient, and that his analysis must include all experiences of the patient while deeply probing the patient's thoughts and problems just to get patients to speak about their problems. 32 The court continued by stating that courts should "guard the secrets which come to the psychiatrist, " 33 and a psychotherapist should not be allowed to disclose any of the secrets provided by the patient. The court concluded "it is just one of those cases [where] the (psychiatrist-patient] privilege ought to be granted and protected. And the social significance of it is probably even greater than that which comes from the protection of the communication between lawyer and client. " 34 Twenty-four years a~ Binder, in May 1976, the Fifth Circuit was the first court to interpret the newly adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 501. In United States v. Meagher, 35 the defendant argued that by allowing his psychotherapist to testifY concerning their conversations, the court "violated his privilege, as a patient, against the disclosure of information confidential to a physician. " 36 The court reasoned that Rule 501 "states that unless otherwise provided, the privilege of a witness shall be governed by the principles of common law as interpreted by U. 
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After the decision to recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege was rejected in Meagher in 1976, other federal circuit courts addressed the same issue with differing conclusions. In 1983, the SiXth·Circuit looked at the language of Proposed Rule 504 and balanced whether the confidentiality interest of the patient successfully outweighed the evidentiary need. The court found that ''the balance tips in favor of the disclosure. " 39 The court reasoned that although the main element of the privilege "is the assurance to the patient that his innermost thoughts may be revealed without fear,'' simply disclosing the patient's identity did not fall within the privilege. 40 In that same year, the Seventh Circuit avoided the issue and ruled that the patient waives confidentiality when he gives his express consent to release the information to an insurance carrier, 41 and the Eleventh Circuit ruled that confidentiality of medical records "[is] not absolute" and can be used as evidence. 42 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed its decision in 1988 by definitively deciding that no psychotherapist-patient privilege should exist. 43 Finally in 1992, the Second Circuit analyzed the Zuniga decision. 44 The court looked to the forty-nine states and the district courts within the Second Circuit which had already enacted statutes establishing the psychotherapistpatient privilege. 45 The court also examined cases in which the Courts of Appeals had not recognized the privilege. 46 In Jaffee, Mary Lu Redmond received extensive counseling from a licensed social worker after a traumatic incident in which Mary Lu, a police officer, shot and killed a man, Allen, while she was on duty. A suit was filed in federal district court claiming that Mary Lu "had violated Allen's constitutional rights by using excessive force during the encounter at the [scene] ." 51 The fact that Redmond had been receiving counseling became apparent to the plaintiff tturing pre-trial discovery. 52
b. Procedural history in Jaffee v. Redmow/ 3
The plaintiff attempted to seek access to notes taken by social worker, Beyer, to use for cross-examination. 54 The defendants resisted the discovery and asserted the notes. "were protected against involuntary disclosure by a psychotherapist-patient privilege. " 55 Even though the district judge rejected this argument, neither Beyer nor Redmond "complied with [the judge's] order to disclose the contents of Beyer's notes [and] [a]t depositions and on the witness stand both either refused to answer certain questions or professed an inability to recall details of their conversations."" The district court judge instructed the jury "that the refusal to turn over Beyer's notes had no 'legal justification' and that the jury could therefore presume that the contents of the notes would have been unfavorable to respondents. The jury awarded petitioner $45,000 on the federal claim· and $500,000 on her state-law claim.''S7 The case then moved to the Supreme Court which began its analysis by weighing the need for probative evidence with the need to recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege. 62 The Court called the public's right to "every man's evidence" a "fundamental maxim.'>6 3 Because the right for the public to hear all of a person's evidence is so imbedded in our judicial system, any exceptions, such as privileges, are "distinctly exceptional.'>64 The Supreme Court applied the same balancing test as the majority of other courts by weighing whether the public and private interests of those protected by the privilege were important enough to outweigh the fundamental maxim of using all available evidence in order to obtain the necessary truths. 65 The Court began by comparing the husband-wife and attorney-client privileges with the psychotherapist-patient privilege due to their common vital need for confidence and trust. 66 The Court concluded that because a psychotherapist's sessions depend on the patient willfully discussing potentially embarrassing facts, emotions, memories and fears, that if disclosed may cause embarrassment or disgrace to the patient, there is a need for the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 67
The court also noted that, with one exception, the federal decisions rejecting the privilege were more than five years old and that the 'need and demand for counseling services has skyrocketed during the past several years.'" !d.
61 
A. History of the Duty-To-Warn Requirement
When Federal Rule of Evidence 501 was adopted, it was very general and it did not provide any specific exceptions to the rule except in instances where common law, the United States Constitution, United States Supreme Court, or Congress provided a specific privilege exception. When the Proposed Rule 504 was introduced, it included three specific exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient privilege, 68 but it did not include an exception regarding dangerous persons. The Advisory Committee believed that patients who opened up and confessed dangerous thoughts and feelings about other people were unlikely to go and commit the crimes. Also, if the patient knew their psychotherapist would be required to disclose the threat, the patient would not be free to communicate with his psychotherapist about all aspects of his problems that require treatment. "By intentionally excluding an exception for dangerous patients, the Advisory Committee showed great deference to the principle that the success of a psychotherapist depends upon his or her ability to communicate freely with a patient in a confidential setting. " 69 The Advisory Committee left the decision to include a dangerous person exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege to the courts, which led to the decisions in Tarasoffl and Tarasoffll.
In 93 The court gave three distinct reasons for rejecting the duty-to-warn. 94 First, the court cautioned that there would be a chilling effect from the knowledge that the psychotherapist has a duty-to-warn concerning statements made by the patient to the psychotherapist. The court reasoned that the chilling effect would be even greater if the patient is aware his statements can be used against him in a criminal proceeding. 95 The court recognized both the importance placed on mental health by the Supreme Court and the consequences of a dangerous person exception. 96 The Hayes court indicated a dangerous person exception ''would have a deleterious effect on the 'atmosphere of confidence and trust' in the psychotherapist/patient relationship.'t9 7
Second, the Hayes court looked to the ways the exception would serve the public interest. 98 At trial, Chase challenged the admissibility of Dr. Dieter's testimony under the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 107 "The district court held that Dr. Dieter's testimony was admissible" reasoning "that the federal psychotherapist-patient privilege did not apply because ... [Chase's] threats were serious when uttered, that harm was imminent, and that disclosure to authorities was the only means of averting the threatened harm. " 108 Chase was found guilty and appealed the conviction. A three-judge panel affirmed both the court's ruling and the conviction. The Ninth Circuit court agreed to hear the case en bane. The Ninth Circuit Court first discussed the Oregon state law because Chase's counseling sessions were conducted in Oregon. Oregon has a discretionary exception to the confidentiality requirement between a psychotherapist and patient. Relying on this rule as well as Jaffee footnote 19, the Chase court held that Dr. Dieter properly disclosed the threats. no However, the main issue of the case rested on whether the court should recognize a dangerous 104 patient exception to the federal testimonial privilege, which may arise from the dangerous-patient exception in state rules of confidentiality. 111 The Chase court declined to recognize a dangerous-patient exception to the federal testimonial privilege. 112 The court reasoned that allowing the exception to the federal testimonial privilege would "significantly injure the interests justifying the existence of the privilege; would have little practical advantage; would encroach significantly on the policy prerogatives of the states; and would go against the experience of all but one of the states in our circuit, 113 Appealing from a summary judgment, the Texas Supreme Court viewed evidence in the light most favorable to Lyndall Zezulka, the nonmovant. 122 The court began its analysis by determining whether or not a duty exists to warn a third-party of a patient's threat by looking to the confidentiality statute that governs the mental health profession in the State of Texas. Three years after Tarasoffll in 1979, the Texas Legislature enacted a statute "governing the disclosure of communications during the course of mental-health treatment." 123 Texas' confidentiality rule does not have an exception that allows disclosure to third parties, though the rule permits disclosure of confidential information to medical or law enforcement personnel. 124 Nonetheless, the court stated that "[i]mposing a legal duty to warn third parties of patient's threats would conflict with the scheme adopted by the Legislature by making disclosure of such threats mandatory," 125 and that imposing a common-law duty to warn on mental-health professionals imposes a "[ c ]atch-22. They either disclose a confidential communication that later proves to be an idle threat and incur liability to the patient, or they fail to disclose a confidential communication that later proves to be a truthful threat and incur liability to the victim and the victim's family." 126 The Thapar court stated, ''we decline to adopt a duty to warn now because the confidentiality statute governing mental-health professionals in Texas makes it unwise to recognize such common-law duty. After Joseph was convicted of murder, Hausler's estate brought suit against the treatment center, Scuderi, and the director of the Center. The trial court granted judgment in favor of the Health Center and the Superior Court affirmed by reiterating the trial court's reasoning that at the time of the ruling, there was no duty-to-warn a third party requirement in Pennsylvania law. However, if such a duty did exist, "[a]ppellant failed to establish a cause of 128. To date, the only federal court to n:cognize an exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege is the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Tenth Circuit relied on footnote 19 in Jaffee when it remanded a case to the district court to determine whether the threat made by the defendant "was serious when it was uttered and whether its disclosure was the only means of averting harm to the President when the disclosure [by the psychotherapist] was made." United States v. Glass, 133 F.3d 1356, 1360 (lOth Cir. 1998). (Upon voluntarily entering a hospital for ongoing mental illness, Glass stated to his psychotherapist that he wanted to shoot President and Mrs. Clinton in order "to get in the history books." !d. at 1357. Days later Glass was released on condition that he remain with his father and attend outpatient therapy. /d. Ten days later, only after discovering Glass bad left his father's residence, local law enforcement and ultimately the Secret Service were advised of Glass' threats against President and Mrs. Clinton. !d. Because there was a ten day interval between the threat and the notification of law enforcement, the Tenth Circuit Court remanded the case to the district court to determine the extent of the seriousness of Glass' threat. In a case of first impression, the Supreme Court ofPennsylvania stated, ''the concept of a duty to protect by warning, albeit limited in certain circumstances, has met with virtually universal approval." 136 The Emerich court relied on public policy principles when it found a duty-to-warn. The court looked to duty and the concept that duty "'amounts to no more than the sum total of those considerations of policy which led the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection from the harm suffered. "' 137 Continuing its analysis, the court examined the societal interest regarding the protectionofPennsylvania'scitizensftomharmbyimposingtheduty-to-warn. "Simply stated, it is reasonable to impose a duty on a mental health professional to warn a third party of an immediate, known and serious risk of potentially lethal harm." 138
b. Delaware (I) Facts in State of Del. v. Bright 139
Rodney. Bright was a United States veteran and had been seeking treatment at various Veterans' Administration facilities for over twenty years. Bright was diagnosed and suffered from manic depression and bi-polar disorder. He had made various threats to harm his ex-wife, but it was not until December 9, 1994, that Bright contacted his psychiatrist, Dr. Mayetta, and told her that he was leaving that day to drive to Delaware to kill is ex-wife. . He told Dr. Mayetta that ''he had several weapons'' and he was either going to shoot [his ex-wife] or "strangle her with his bare hands." 140 Dr. Mayetta contacted local law enforcement officials. Bright was consequently arrested only a mile and half from his ex-wife's workplace. At the time of his arrest, Bright possessed a knife, duct tape and rope. The Delaware Superior Court held that Dr. Mayetta's disclosure of Bright's threats against his ex-wife did not violate the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 145 The court began its discussion on the issue of the psychotherapist-patient privilege by recognizing that "confidentiality statutes exist along with the well-recognized law of privileges, ... The court also found that the federal confidentiality statute did not apply to the given situation due to Bright's reliance on a statute that applied to persons being treated in federally assisted drug and/or alcohol treatment programs. Because Bright wasn't being treated for drug or alcohol abuse and the disclosure of the statements was not derived ftom treatment of drug or alcohol abuse counseling. the federal statutes did not apply in this case. Id. at 1062. confidentiality statutes and laws of privilege can co-exist, the exceptions to these statutes and laws can also co-exist. The court identified the duty-towarn exception as a "well established exception. '' 147 Quoting the reasoning in Tarasoff II as well as another Delaware Supreme Court case, 148 the Bright court stated that not only do "mental health professionals have a duty of confidentiality to their patients, they also have an affirmative duty to persons other than· the patient to exercise reasonable care in the treatment and discharge of such patients." 149 The court defined reasonable care to include "a 'duty to warn potential victims or a class of potential victims and/or control, to some appropriate degree, the actions ofthe patient."' 150
IV. THE IMPUCATIONS OF THE EWING DEciSIONS
A. Holding and Rationale in Ewing v. Goldstein 151
In the Ewing decisions, the courts extended a statute· and statutory definitions beyond their ordinary meanings. Ewing v; Goldstein was the first of the two Ewing cases to be decided. 152 The appellate court reviewed the trial court's construction of California Civil Code 43.92 and determined that it was ''unduly narrow." 153 The trial court determined ''the Ewings had failed to satisfy the statutory requirements necessary to defeat the psychotherapist's immunity, because 'the patient himselr had not communicated the threat to the therapist." 154 California Civil Code section 43.92 establishes the duty of a psychotherapist to warn and protect an identifiable third person. 155 The court then looked at balancing the interests the statute was protecting and finally examined whether the information can come from the patient's family. "A 'patient' is defmed as 'a person who consults a psychotherapist or submits to an examination by a psychotherapist for the purpose of securing a diagnosis or preventive, palliative, or curative treatment of his mental or emotional condition." 159 The court recognized the dichotomy present in Section 43.92. "Section 43.92 represents a legislative effort to strike an appropriate balance between conflicting policy interests." 160 The policy interest the court refers to is the ''need to preserve a patient confidence [in order to achieve] an effective diagnosis and treatment of a mental illness or an emotional problem [that can be] severely undermined when a patient cannot be assured that a statement made in the privacy of his therapist's office will not be revealed." 161 The conflicting interest as stated by the court is "under limited circumstances, preserving a confidence is less important than protecting the safety of someone whom the patient intends to harm." 162 The court determined that this balancing of interests did not apply in this case because there was not a confidence to be protected. This is because the confidence arises from the confidential relationship between a psychotherapist and the patient Victor Colello was not in any type of relationship with Dr. Goldstein that would trigger the confidence. The confidential relationship was between Geno and Dr. Goldstein. Requiring Dr.
Goldstein to warn Keith Ewing was not warranted because there was no confidence that needed protecting and therefore, no duty should have been imposed. Prosser says that "duty'' is the only word in law where the conclusion of liability is stated in just one word. 163 · He continues that "many factors interplay: the hand of history, our ideas of morals and justice, the convenience of administration of the rule, and our social ideas as to where loss should fall." 164 A classic English definition of duty maintains that "when circumstances place one individual in such a position with regard to another ... ordinary sense would recognize the danger of injury to the other .... " 165 In this case, it would take more than simple ordinary sense for Dr. Goldstein or Northridge Hospital Medical Center to recognize the danger that Geno posed to Keith Ewing. There was no communication from Geno, and a dutyto-warn requirement normally emerges out of the private, confidential communications between a doctor and the patient. family" as "spouse, parents, children, or his or her children's spouses"); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67360(cXl) (West 2004) (defining "immediate family" as "spouse, child, parent, stepparent, grandparent, grandchild, brother, sister, parent-in-law, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, nephew, niece, aunt, uncle, or first cousin, or the spouse of any of those persons, or guardian of any of those persons"); CAI-Gov'rCODE § 51230.l(c) (West2004) (defining "immediate family" as "spouse of the landowner, the natural or adopted children of the landowner, the parents of the landowner, or the siblings of the landowner"); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 82029 (West 2004) (defining "immediate family" as "spouse and dependent children"); CAL. PENAL CoDE § 217.1(cX1) (West 2004) (defining "immediate family'' as spouse, child, stepchild, brother, stepbrother, sister, stepsister, mother, stepmother, father, or stepfather); CAL. PENAL CODE § 422 (West 2004) (defining "immediate family" as "any spouse, whether by marriage or not, parent, child, any person related by consanguinity or affinity within the second degree, or any other person who regularly resides in the household, or who, within the prior six months, regularly resided in the household"); CAL. The court reasoned that a person's emotional problems do not "exist in a vacuum" 168 and discussed that all aspects of the patient's life have an impact on the patient's emotional and mental health. The court stated that even if communication during therapy is given by a family member, these communications need to be protected in order to further "the patient's therapy by giving the therapist a fuller understanding of the problem or illness for which his or her expertise is needed by encouraging the patient and his or her family members to fully disclose information they might otherwise be embarrassed or reluctant to reveal. " 169 Therefore, the court is trying to extend the blanket of confidentiality over the patient's immediate family member. Congress refused to enact legislation to add the psychotherapist-patient privilege to the Federal Rules of Evidence by enacting Rule 501 instead. It took many state courts and finally federal courts over twenty years to even begin to recognize the need and requirement of a psychotherapist-patient privilege. Now, the California Court of Appeals has broadened this privilege and has extended this confidentiality to immediate family members of the patient by saying this communication has to be protected in order to further the treatment and diagnosis of the patient.
This goes far beyond the scope and intent of the California statute.
The court wants to make sure that a patient's treatment is achieved by protecting the immediate family member's communications about diagnosis and treatment and holding the doctors and hospital liable for these types of communications. However, neither of the Ewing decisions specifically defined "immediate family member." Knowing there are differing definitions of"family member" within California legislation, 170 the court stated that this case and opinion does not address or concern situations where someone other than a patient's immediate family "conveys the information of the patient's potential dangerousness to the therapist. " 171 The California statute on which bothEwingcourts rely does not mention anything about the psychotherapist actually holding a belief or prediction of the violent propensities of the patient. Instead, the statute specifically states that there is a duty when the patient has communicated the threat to the psychotherapist. 174 
C. Slippery Slope the California Court of Appeals Has Created
Both Ewing courts claim that part of each decision is based on the statutory ·construction and the legislative intent of a statute, but instead of clearing up any discrepancies, inconsistencies or confusions, they have created them. The courts went beyond the scope of a statute that was enacted to protect along-held psychotherapist-patientprivilege. The statute allowed only one exception to this well-recognized privilege that protects a patient's privacy and confidentiality during the patient's mental health treatments. The Ewing courts have taken this one exception and have now opened the floodgates oflitigation. The door has been opened for more people to claim that some person told another person that they were going to injure someone else, and then ultimately hold the doctor to an affirmative duty on this thirdparty information.
California The majority certainly inserted "family member" into this statute and thus broadened the definition of ''patient communication," which, in tum, broadened the statute. If the legislature intended to include family members in the statute, it would have done so, especially given the numerous definitions of family member provided in certain California codes. 177 The Ewing courts have also brought confusion into the California mental health profession. Until now, psychotherapists in California have had a dutyto-warn an intended third party of imminent harm from threats made by the psychotherapist's patient. Now a psychotherapist has to try and determine In almost all circumstances, the family member will not be a patient of the psychotherapist. The psychotherapist will have to determine the mental state of the person conveying the information by determining not only whether the threat can cause imminent harm to an intended third-party victim but also whether the threat is valid. It will be nearly impossible, without obtaining the necessary background and history, for the psychotherapist to properly assess the mental state of the information provider ("family member'') and to ultimately decide if the information that has been provided triggers the duty-to-warn requirement.
The California Supreme Court in Tarasoff II recognized the difficulty that a psychotherapist has in trying to forecast whether a patient presents a serious danger to an intended victim. 178 The court does not expect the therapist to ''render a perfect performance {but] the therapist need only exercise 'that reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily possessed and exercise by members of [that professional specialty] under similar circumstances. "' 179 There has never been a similar circumstance in Dr.
Goldstein's situation. The California Court of Appeals has gone beyond the California Supreme Court's decision in Tarasoff II when it decided that Dr. Goldstein's recommendation of hospitalization was inadequate and that he should have also warned Keith Ewing or law enforcement officials about Geno's threat. The Tarasoff II court also stated that a ''therapist is free to exercise his or her own best judgment without liability; proof, aided by hindsight, that he or she judged wrongly is insufficient to establish negligence." 180 Dr. Goldstein did exercise his best judgment in this case. He had a conversation with Geno's father and advised him to take Geno to the hospital. Again, Dr. Goldstein never examined or talked to Geno. His best judgment was to advise hospitalization and that should be all that is required of him in this circumstance. The court has decided to take the "proof, aided by hindsight" approach to this situation; 181 There is no way Dr. Goldstein could have truly known Geno 's intent or seriousness of the threat without the threat being conveyed directly to Dr. Goldstein.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Emerich, relying on Tarasoff, stated that there must be a special relationship between the defendant and ''the person whose conduct needs to be controlled . 
